Efficient breach of contract - the role of damage measures
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Sprache:Englisch
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Produktdetails
Format
ePUB
Kopierschutz
Nein
Family Sharing
Nein
Text-to-Speech
Ja
Erscheinungsdatum
14.06.2007
Verlag
GRINSeitenzahl
20 (Printausgabe)
Dateigröße
298 KB
Auflage
1. Auflage
Sprache
Englisch
EAN
9783638808781
Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Business economics - Law, grade: 1,0, Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg (Faculty of Economics and Management), course: Law and Economics, language: English, abstract: 1. Introduction
On the level of economic transactions, contractual relations have emerged over time to govern behavior of people involved in doing business in order to promote the efficient allocation of scarce ressources.1 Thereby, contracts create order, reduce uncertainty or transform uncertainty into risk and thus are basic premises allowing for the exchange of goods or services.2 However, depending on the nature of the economic transaction, parties involved in a contractual agreement may prefer to grant breach of contract if it proves to be efficient compared to performing the contract throughout duration. Hence, in order to guarantee the mutual benefit and thus, in fact, pareto efficiency of breach of contract, contractual settings have to be designed sophisticatedly to account for situations, where a contractual party may want to default and breach a contract.
Based on a paper by Steven Shavell,3 in the following, damage measures shall be critically discussed as efficient coordination mechanisms of interests in the event of breach of contract.
First of all, the need for contractual settings in order to promote efficient breach of contract given incomplete contingent contracting will be outlined. Then, a light shall be shed on the model of damage measures as used and introduced by Shavell. Thereafter, Shavell's approach shall be critically discussed and some further implications will be given.
On the level of economic transactions, contractual relations have emerged over time to govern behavior of people involved in doing business in order to promote the efficient allocation of scarce ressources.1 Thereby, contracts create order, reduce uncertainty or transform uncertainty into risk and thus are basic premises allowing for the exchange of goods or services.2 However, depending on the nature of the economic transaction, parties involved in a contractual agreement may prefer to grant breach of contract if it proves to be efficient compared to performing the contract throughout duration. Hence, in order to guarantee the mutual benefit and thus, in fact, pareto efficiency of breach of contract, contractual settings have to be designed sophisticatedly to account for situations, where a contractual party may want to default and breach a contract.
Based on a paper by Steven Shavell,3 in the following, damage measures shall be critically discussed as efficient coordination mechanisms of interests in the event of breach of contract.
First of all, the need for contractual settings in order to promote efficient breach of contract given incomplete contingent contracting will be outlined. Then, a light shall be shed on the model of damage measures as used and introduced by Shavell. Thereafter, Shavell's approach shall be critically discussed and some further implications will be given.
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