• Produktbild: Strategic Social Choice
  • Produktbild: Strategic Social Choice

Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

05.11.2012

Abbildungen

XVIII, 2 illus., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

154

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1 cm

Gewicht

272 g

Auflage

Repr. d. Ausg. v. 2010

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-26505-1

Beschreibung

Rezension

From the reviews:

“The book studies stable representations of constitutions. … the book is very well written and perfectly organized … . I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way.” (Agnieszka Rusinowska, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, 2013)

“The book presents in terms of effectivity functions (i.e. coalitional game forms) a very deep, clear and consistent exposition of the most important social choice problem–coalitional decision making. … Written by two authors who have made outstanding contributions to the developed theory, the book will be very useful for game and social choice experts, lecturers, and master’s and Ph.D. students in these fields.” (Fouad T. Aleskerov, Mathematical Reviews, Issue 2012 b)

Zitat

From the reviews: "The book studies stable representations of constitutions. ... the book is very well written and perfectly organized ... . I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way." (Agnieszka Rusinowska, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, 2013) "The book presents in terms of effectivity functions (i.e. coalitional game forms) a very deep, clear and consistent exposition of the most important social choice problem--coalitional decision making. ... Written by two authors who have made outstanding contributions to the developed theory, the book will be very useful for game and social choice experts, lecturers, and master's and Ph.D. students in these fields." (Fouad T. Aleskerov, Mathematical Reviews, Issue 2012 b)

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

05.11.2012

Abbildungen

XVIII, 2 illus., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

154

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1 cm

Gewicht

272 g

Auflage

Repr. d. Ausg. v. 2010

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-26505-1

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: GPSR Kontakt

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  • Produktbild: Strategic Social Choice
  • Produktbild: Strategic Social Choice
  • Preview of this book.- Representations of constitutions: Introduction to Part I; Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Nash consistent representations; Acceptable representations; Strongly consistent representations; Nash consistent representation through lottery models; On the continuity of representations of constitutions.- Consistent voting: Introduction to Part II; Feasible elimination procedures; Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions; Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.