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Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing A Perceptualist Account

31,99 €

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Beschreibung

This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

Beschreibung

This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag Oxford University Press
Seitenzahl

244

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag Oxford University Press
Seitenzahl

244

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,7/2,3 cm

Gewicht

363 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-780234-2

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing
    • Preface
    • Acknowledgments
    • Introduction
    • Part One: Perception
    • Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World
    • I. Perception Broadly Conceived
    • II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
    • III. The Representational Character of Perception
    • Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content
    • I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
    • II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions
    • III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects
    • Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
    • I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy
    • II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects
    • III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
    • IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
    • V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?
    • VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels
    • VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition
    • Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification
    • I. Perceptual Knowledge
    • II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
    • III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
    • IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties
    • Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
    • I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
    • II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
    • III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
    • IV. Reasons as Explanations
    • V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds
    • Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification
    • I. Epistemological Internalism
    • II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
    • III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
    • IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
    • V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
    • VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
    • VII. Perception and Singular Reference
    • Part Two: Perception and the A Priori
    • Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension
    • I. Perception and Intuition
    • II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse
    • III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
    • IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions
    • Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori
    • I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
    • II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
    • III. Understanding and Imagination
    • IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
    • V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
    • VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
    • VII. Obstacles to Comprehension
    • Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity
    • I. Self-Evidence and Provability
    • II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?
    • III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
    • IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
    • V. Apriority and Necessity
    • Part Three: Practical Knowledge
    • Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action
    • I. Belief and Action
    • II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
    • III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action
    • Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
    • I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action
    • II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
    • III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
    • IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning
    • Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
    • I. Inference and Inferential Belief
    • II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
    • III. Reasoning and Rational Action
    • IV. The Scope of Rational Action
    • V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency
    • Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action
    • References
    • Index